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Novel Metaphors Comprehension in
a Child with High-Functioning Autism
Spectrum Disorder: A Study on
Assessment and Treatment
Sergio Melogno*, Maria A. Pinto and Margherita Orsolini
Dipartimento di Psicologia dei Processi di Sviluppo e Socializzazione, “Sapienza,” Università di Roma, Rome, Italy
Until the first decade of the current millennium, the literature on metaphor comprehension
highlighted typical difficulties in children with high-functioning Autism Spectrum Disorder
(ASD). More recently, some scholars have devised special programs for enhancing
the capability of understanding metaphors in these children. This article presents a
case study based on a treatment aiming at enhancing novel metaphor comprehension
in a high-functioning child with ASD. M.M., a pseudoacronym for an 8;10 year-old
boy, diagnosed with high-functioning ASD, was first assessed with a metaphor
comprehension test. This testing (at time T0) highlighted a rigid refusal of metaphors
and a marked tendency toward literal interpretation. A baseline treatment (8 sessions
of 45–60min each, twice a week) was implemented, based on a series of recognition,
denomination and emotion comprehension activities. M.M.’s metaphor comprehension
was assessed a second time (T1), followed by the experimental treatment (same duration
and frequency as the first one), specifically focused on metaphor comprehension. Finally,
a third assessment of metaphor comprehension took place (T2), followed by a last
assessment 4 months later (follow-up, T3). The comparison between the performances
at the metaphor comprehension test across the four assessments, from T0 to T3,
showed that the baseline treatment produced no effect at all, whereas a significant
improvement appeared at T2, just after the experimental treatment, later confirmed at
the follow up. Both quantitative and qualitative results showed an evident improvement
in the way M.M. handled the semantic issues posed by the metaphors of the test, in line
with the strategies he was taught during the treatment.
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INTRODUCTION
Metaphor comprehension difficulties in high-functioning children with Autism SpectrumDisorder
(ASD, henceforth) are well documented (Happé, 1993, 1995; Norbury, 2005; Rundblad and Annaz,
2010; Melogno et al., 2012a,c; Kasirer and Mashal, 2014; Vulchanova et al., 2015). Faced with
metaphors, children with ASD tend to remain firmly anchored to literal interpretations. For
instance, if one of two children say “Autumn leaves are butterflies,” the listener might interpret
the relationship between the two terms (X = autumn leaves, Y= butterflies) literally, i.e., as an
identity, and fails to understand the speaker’s intended meaning. In this case, he/she can only reject
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the sentence because autumn leaves are clearly not butterflies.
However, if the listener realizes that what the speaker means is
“Autumn leaves are like butterflies,” he/she can compare the two
terms and look for a shared property, in this case, the movement
or the shape, the color, etc., and come to a plausible interpretation
of the metaphor.
In developmental literature, metaphors like the one above
are called sensory (Winner, 1998), because they combine terms
pertaining to the same physical sphere, in which the link
between the two parts of the metaphor relies on functional
or perceptual properties (color, shape, etc.). Other metaphors
are called physico-psychological (Winner, 1998) because the two
terms that compose them pertain to the physical and the
psychological domain (e.g., “Juliet is the sun”). Another relevant
distinction is between dead and novel metaphors, the former
being those we conventionally use (e.g., “He is a snake”), and
the latter being created on the spot (e.g.,“Autumn leaves are
butterflies”).
Based on empirical evidence, 6–7 year olds typically
developing children are already able to guess that metaphors are
a deliberate means to communicate and not merely a mistake
or a lie (Demorest et al., 1983). The first signs of metaphorical
understanding can even be found at the age of 4 (Keil, 1986;
Gentner, 1988), although this ability is gradually refined later on
(Vosniadou, 1987; Declercq et al., 2010).
Research on metaphor comprehension has found lower
performance in high functioning children with ASD than in
neurotypical children (Happé, 1993, 1995; Dennis et al., 2001;
Martin and McDonald, 2004; Norbury, 2005; Rundblad and
Annaz, 2010), particularly in a subgroup characterized by
language difficulties (Norbury, 2005; Gernsbacher and Pripas-
Kapit, 2012). How to explain impaired metaphor comprehension
in children with ASD is still an open issue. Some scholars (Happé,
1993, 1995) claim that a deficit in the theory of mind would
undermine the comprehension of what the speaker means (X
is like Y) beyond what the speaker says (X is Y). However,
Norbury (2005) showed that theory of mind is a “necessary
but not sufficient” factor to metaphor comprehension and that
specific language competences such as semantic knowledge are
also necessary. Another possible explanation comes from the
tendency (Weak Central Coherence) shown by people with
ASD to process information locally rather than globally. This
could have negative consequences on the ability to use sentence
context to disambiguate meaning (Rundblad and Annaz, 2010).
The efficiency of executive functions is another factor that may
account for the difficulties encountered by children with ASD
(Mashal and Kasirer, 2011; Kasirer and Mashal, 2014).
Recent research based on experimental and case studies
has raised the question of whether metaphor comprehension
can be enhanced in children with ASD (Mashal and Kasirer,
2011; Persicke et al., 2012; Melogno et al., 2012b). Adapting a
procedure used in brain lesions rehabilitation (Lundgren et al.,
2006), Mashal and Kasirer (2011) created thinking maps to
train children in comparing the two terms of a metaphor. In
a similar vein, Persicke et al. (2012) devised a procedure to
help children with ASD in analyzing metaphors embedded in
stories. Step by step, children were guided toward rejecting
irrelevant semantic features and abstracting the relevant ones.
The encouraging results of these studies suggest that teaching
children with ASD how to compare terms in a metaphor can
enhance metaphor comprehension. On the other hand, research
on this type of intervention could illuminate the role of the
many factors invoked so far to explain difficulties in metaphor
comprehension in children with ASD. For instance, a training
focused on semantic knowledge could test the relevance of this
factor, as claimed by Norbury (2005).
The present case study extends the training method set
out by Mashal and Kasirer (2011) by including renaming
exercises aimed at enhancing semantic flexibility and adult-child
interaction aimed at stimulating metalinguistic explanations.
BACKGROUND
M.M. is a high functioning child with ASD (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013) who came to consultation in a clinical center
on developmental disabilities when he was 8 years and 10months
and was diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome based on DSM
IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria. The
procedure involved the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule
(ADOS; Lord et al., 2000), the Krug Asperger Disorder Index
(KADI; Krug and Arick, 2003) and the Social Responsiveness
Scale (Constantino and Gruber, 2002).
M.M. had fluent language but relevant difficulties in managing
interactions. Namely, he tended to direct conversation toward
his preferred topics on a particularly erudite mode. His parents
also reported that M.M. took things too literally and didn’t
understand the real meaning of the conversation. M.M.’s rigid
interpretation of language usages were paralleled by other
forms of rigidity in behavior, at home and school, that could be
observed in everyday ritualistic sequences. M.M.’s intellectual
level was within normal range (Total IQ= 110), as emerged from
clinical assessment (WISC III, Wechsler, 1991)1, with a Verbal
IQ of 115 and a Performance IQ of 103. Performances within
norms were expected in grammar and in lexical competencies,
which was confirmed by the Test of Reception of Grammar
(TROG-2; Bishop, 2003; standard score: 107) and by the
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT; Dunn and Dunn, 1981;
standard score: 115). On the other hand, based on the diagnosis,
a drop in metaphor comprehension was expected, which was
also confirmed by a subtest assessing figurative language (APL
Medea; Lorusso, 2007). In the first part of this subtest (“verbal
metaphors”), the child has to listen to either a metaphorical
sentence (e.g.,“Mark is a lion”), or an idiomatic expression
and must explain its meaning; in the second part (“visual
metaphors”), the child has to listen to an idiomatic expression
(e.g.,“You have your head in the clouds”), and must indicate
the picture that matches the appropriate meaning choosing
among four possibilities. Seven times out of 8, M.M. gave a literal
interpretation.
In the Theory of mind and Affect recognition tests of NEPSY
II (Developmental Neuropsychological Assessment; Korkman
1At the time of this study, WISC III was the only version of the Wechsler scales
available in Italy.
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et al., 2007), difficulties inmentalization and emotion recognition
were expected, which were confirmed by low performance in the
first test (scaled score: 6) and impaired performance in the other
(scaled score: 4).
DISCUSSION
The Research Design
After approval from the Ethics Committee of the Dipartimento
di Pediatria e Neuropsichiatria Infantile (“Sapienza” University
of Rome; Department of Pediatrics and Child Neuropsychiatry,
“Sapienza” Univ. of Rome) we asked an informed consent to
M.M.’s parents who accepted to have their child involved in a
treatment. M.M. himself consented verbally.
After clinical diagnosis, M.M.’s metaphor comprehension
was first assessed with a specific test (Time 0). Then, M.M. was
engaged in a baseline treatment focused on Theory of Mind
(8 sessions of 45–60 min each, twice a week) and assessed a
second time with a metaphor comprehension test (T1). Then an
experimental treatment followed (same duration and frequency
as the baseline one) targeting metaphor comprehension.
Finally, a third assessment of metaphor comprehension took
place (T2), followed by a follow-up assessment 4 months later
(follow-up, T3).
Testing the Treatment Effects: Metaphor
Comprehension Assessment
Considering the M.M.’s difficulties in non-literal understanding,
we chose the JuniorMetaphor Comprehension Test (Henceforth,
Jnr MCT, Pinto et al., 2008), an Italian instrument validated for
4–6-year-old children. The test assesses the ability to explain
the meaning of 12 metaphors included in sentences, and 13
metaphors contextualized in four stories. Nearly all of these
metaphors are “sensory,” e.g.,“The moon is a light bulb,” where
“moon” pertains to the domain of “celestial bodies” and “light
bulb” to that of “electric devices.”
The coding system is based on a three-step scale.
A score of 0 is assigned when the child declares he/she just
does’nt know (elusion), or refuses the possibility of using words
metaphorically (refusal), or interprets the metaphor literally
(literal interpretation).
A score of 1 is assigned when a semantic feature common to
both terms of the metaphor is identified, i.e., a relevant common
ground, based on functional or perceptual characteristics
(identification of a relevant semantic ground).
A score of 2 is assigned when the explanation considers
both differences and resemblances between the two terms of the
metaphor (identification of an elaborated ground). The maximum
score of the Jnr MCT is 50.
Jnr MCT has high reliability, as measured by Cronbach’alpha
(0.860), high test-retest correlations (r–tt:0.848), and high
interrater agreement, as measured by Cohen’s K (0.73 for the 5
year olds and 0.74 for the 6 year olds).
In the follow-up assessment we administered both the Jnr
MCT and the APL-Medea’s subtest assessing figurative language2.
2A psychologist trained to administer the MCT and the APL Medea was
responsible for the administration and blind to all the issues concerning the
intervention.
Baseline and Experimental Training
The baseline training involved the child in watching videoclips
together with the adult, and in a subsequent discussion that
stimulated Theory of Mind. The child was asked to identify the
visual cues of a character’s emotion, name the targeted emotion,
and infer the characters’ mental states. The experimental training
was based on the following hypotheses: (a) novel metaphors
generate a cognitive conflict, as the metaphorical meaning
conflicts with the literal one; (b) a child with ASD can
approach such a conflict as a problem-solving activity, by
analyzing meanings on explicit grounds; (c) inhibiting a literal
interpretation, switching from one semantic feature to another,
considering a whole discourse context to comprehend a sentence,
are all processes that can be taught to children with ASD. Based
on these hypotheses, three main activities were implemented.
The first activity, “X is like Y heuristic” (strategy 1), consisted
of exercises training the child to inhibit a literal interpretation,
change a metaphor into the corresponding simile (“X is like Y”)
and use thinkingmaps to search for semantic similarities between
X and Y (strategy 2, Comparative strategy. Table 1). In the second
activity (Table 2), the child was asked to use unconventional
labels to rename objects or images. When renaming concerned
associates (flour re-named as bread) the adult provided examples
of metaphorical labels (flour re-named as snow).
The third activity were story-matching exercises where the
child had to listen to short stories and then choose between two
different metaphorical sentences to conclude the story (Table 2).
The experimental training was implemented in two different
phases, in 8 sessions of 45–60 min, twice a week, using novel
sensory metaphors. Each session of the first phase (2 weeks)
included one X is like Y exercise, explained and modeled by
the therapist (SM), then one exercise of joint construction of
metaphorical meaning, and two exercises of renaming. The X
is like Y heuristic was consolidated through joint construction
and autonomous activities in phase 2, which also included story-
matching exercises.
In the whole, the child was involved in 16 “X is like Y,”
48 renaming and 12 story-matching exercises. None of the
metaphors used for the assessment was included in the exercises.
RESULTS
Table 3 (A,B) shows the changes inM.M.’s performance at the Jnr
MCT as a function of the different assessment phases.
At T0, M.M.’s performance was lower than that of a 6-year-
old typically developing child. In particular, 0 level answers were
prevalent (60%), and mainly consisted of refusals (“It’s not true,”
“It can’t be,” “It doesn’t exist”). The other 40%was entirely at level
1 (relevant basic ground between the two metaphor terms).
At T1, after the baseline treatment, the distribution of
percentages of answers by levels was nearly identical to that
obtained at T0. At T2, after the experimental training, M.M.’s
0 level answers nearly disappeared, level 2 answers (elaborated
ground between the two terms of the metaphor) were produced
for the first time and prevailed on level 1 answers. At T3, the total
Jnr MCT’s score was further increased and higher compared to
6-year old typically developing children. The massive decrease of
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TABLE 1 | Examples of activities with the X is like Y heuristic.
Example of modeling
The adult read the sentence:“Skyscrapers are the city’s giraffes”
Strategy 1: “Is like strategy” If someone says “skyscrapers are the city’s giraffes,” people who listen to
that sentence know that skyscrapers simply cannot be giraffes.
Skyscrapers are buildings and giraffes are animals. But, to understand what
is meant by this sentence I may use my first strategy with cards. I will
replace X with Y and add “is like.” Then, the sentence becomes skyscrapers
are like giraffes.
Strategy 2: Comparative strategy Now, I will use my second strategy. I’ll be thinking of the characteristics of the
skyscrapers and write them down here in my thinking map. Then, I’ll write
that skyscrapers are buildings, that they are very high, they have elevators,
etc. Now, it’s giraffes’ turn. I’ll be thinking of the characteristics of the
giraffes and write them down in my map. Giraffes are animals, they are very
high, have a long neck, they live in savannahs, etc. Right.
Now, I’ll see which characteristics are appropriate for both skyscrapers and
giraffes. For instance, “building” is appropriate for skyscraper but has
nothing to do with giraffes, then I’ll reject it.......”Very high” goes for both,
then, I’ll accept it as an appropriate characteristic. Skyscrapers and giraffes
are both very high.
Metalinguistic reflection Then, we may state that the guy who said “skyscrapers are giraffes” actually
meant that skyscrapers are the highest buildings in a city just as giraffes are
the highest animals in a savannah. The word “giraffe” replaces another one,
in this case “very high,” because it expresses the meaning of being very
high.
Example of joint construction
Strategy 1: “Is like strategy” Adult: “What does this sentence mean: Bedroom is a safe ?”
M.M. “Bedroom is like a safe”
Adult: “Ok, shall we use strategy 1 and write down the new sentence in the
bubble ?”
Strategy 2: Comparative strategy Adult: “Now we can say all we know about safes.”
M.M.: “It can be iron made, and there can be money or jewelery inside.
You can open it with a key or a code. Pharaons used to have the room of
treasure, like Sethi in the Kings’ Valley.”
The adult invited M.M. to write down these features in the bubbles of the
thinking map. M.M. wrote IRON, KEY, CODE, MONEY, TREASURE for the
word Safe and BED, CARPET, GAMES for the word Bedroom.
MM. was asked to select characteristics that can be common to Bedroom
and Safe.
M.M. selected KEY and discarded every other feature except TREASURE.
M.M.: “A bedroom can have treasures.”
Adult: “Treasures like those of Sethi”?
M.M.: “No, perhaps a precious collection of shells, marbles or bus tickets.
Nobody has to touch them, as with a safe.”
(Continued)
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TABLE 1 | Continued
Metalinguistic reflection Adult and M.M. came to the conclusion that a bedroom is a suitable place
where to keep precious objects.
Example of autonomous activity
“The chocolate cake is a rock”
The child had to insert the sentence in the bubbles using strategy 1 (written
exercise) like in the example in the left column.
The child had to build the thinking map with CAKE and ROCK (written
exercise) like in the example in the left column.
Metalinguistic reflection (oral discussion) Adult: “What does it mean, then, that the chocolate cake is a rock?”
M.M.: “Well, it means that the cake is dried, tough, you really cannot eat it.”
level 0 answers was confirmed, and a further increase of level 2
answers was observed.
M.M.’s answers at the item “The scarf of the sky is colorful”
across the four testing times significantly show his qualitative
improvements in processing the metaphors of the test. At T0 and
at T1, the child stated unconditionally: “It’s not true! The sky
cannot have scarves!” (refusal). After the treatment, at T2, the
answer was more complex and accurate. “I don’t have a clue of
what it might be, it might be the clouds or the mountains...... it’s
the rainbow!.” For the first time, M.M. envisaged more than one
interpretation, and moved from a negative certitude (X cannot be
Y) toward a plurality of possible meanings (X might be Y or Z),
and eventually came to a plausible metaphorical interpretation
(X can be Y). At T3, the child’s answer was: “The milky way is the
colorful scarf of the sky... because planets are made of different
materials and each has a color. For example, Mars’colour is red...
Uranus’colour is blue... and the Earth’s color is a mixture between
blue, which is the sea, and green... the grass.... on the soil, which is
brown.” M.M.’s evolution is very evident. He did not give up his
typical erudite mode; rather, he used it for explaining linguistic
meanings (“because”) instead of asserting things. In this case,
M.M. provided an explanation of a semantic association between
the “colorful scarf of the sky” and the “milky way,” which is itself
a novel metaphor.
To test whether there were significant differences between
total scores at different testing times (T0–T3), we calculated
the standard error measurement. The results showed only one
significant difference, that between T1 and T2 (Se: 4.6764,
significant at p < 0.05 level). This confirms that the only
significant improvement in M.M.’s performance at the Jnr MCT
took place after the experimental training. In addition to the Jnr
MCT, in the follow-up assessment the APL- Medea, already used
in the diagnosis, was also administered. As shown in Figure 1,
M.M. remarkably improved both in verbal and visual metaphors.
The results were within norms.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
From the initial diagnosis to the follow-up assessment M.M.
moved from 0 to 1 correct answer for visual metaphors and from
one level 1 score to two level 2 scores for verbal metaphors.
The aim of this study was to analyze the effectiveness of
an experimental treatment on the comprehension of novel
metaphors in M.M., a child with ASD.
Enhancing M.M.’s capability of handling novel metaphors
was particularly challenging as the child came to consultation
with a very assertive and rigid approach to language use. The
originality of the treatment was to apply a multi-step explicit
linguistic procedure. At first, a metaphor that could appear as
an absurdity (X is Y) was transformed into a more acceptable
sentence (X is like Y); then, the semantic features likely to provide
a common ground between the two terms of the metaphor were
identified, and on these grounds, a plausible interpretation was
constructed.
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TABLE 2 | Examples of renaming and story-matching activities.
Renaming
The adult showed M.M. a signaling disk (X) and asked him to rename it. M.M.: “A lollipop.”
If the child had renamed the object in a non-metaphorical way
(e.g., “flour” renamed as “bread,” or “bag”), the adult might
have proposed an appropriate solution attributable to another
child. “You know, another child told me so: “flour”-“snow.”
The adult asked M.M. to justify the new label (e.g., “lollipop”) chosen for
renaming.
M.M: “It has the same round shape. The color can be red as
a strawberry-flavored lollipop, or green as mint-flavored
lollipop.”
The adult asked M.M to select or draw a picture that matched the label chosen
for renaming.
M.M chose the image that matched the new label.
The adult asked M.M to phrase the association between the object (X) and the
label he chose (Y) as a “X is Y” type of metaphor.
M.M.: “The signaling disk is a mint-and-strawberry flavored
lollipop.”
Story-matching
The adult told M.M. the following story:
“At school, the pupils are lining up to enter into the classroom. Alice is the
smallest child of the group....”
Which one of the following endings of the story is the most appropriate, “Alice is
a ladybug” or “Alice is a giraffe” ?
M.M. chose the appropriate alternative. (“Alice is a ladybug”).
TABLE 3 | Raw (subparts and total) and standardized scores* at each testing time (A); Frequencies and percentages of different levels of answers at each
testing time (B).
Time 0 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3
Raw scores Z Raw scores Z Raw scores Z Raw scores Z
(A)
Met-Sentences 7 7 18 21
Met-Stories 3 4 21 22
Total 10 −2.13 11 −1.95 39 3.14 43 3.87
(B)
Level 0 15 (60%) 14 (56%) 2 (8%) 2 (8%)
Level 1 10 (40%) 11 (44%) 7 (28%) 3 (12%)
Level 2 0 0 16 (64%) 20 (80%)
*Standardized scores are computed on the total correct answers.
After this experimental training, the child started handling
the items of the Jnr MCT in a completely different manner.
Although these items had nothing in common with the
linguistic materials of the treatment, M.M.’s approach
became at the same time more flexible (e.g., both the
“rainbow” and the “milky way” could be conceived as
“colorful parts of the sky”) and more consistent in his
explanations.
It might be argued that, after four administrations of the
same test, the child had learnt the acceptable answers. However,
various evidences suggest that M.M.’s improvements with novel
metaphors comprehension cannot be interpreted as a result of
test repetition. First, the child never received a feedback on
what was a good performance at the test, so he could not
know whether his answers had improved or not. Second, what
the test assesses is not the number of right answers, but the
number ofwell grounded explanations of metaphors. Third, M.M.
remarkably improved also in a subtest that was administered
in the diagnostic phase and at the follow-up but not in the
intermediate testing phases (APL-Medea; Lorusso, 2007). As
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FIGURE 1 | Results at the APL test. (A) Percentage of correct answers for verbal and visual metaphors at the APL test at T0 and T33. (B)4 Standardized scores of
correct answers for verbal and visual metaphors at the APL test at T0 and T3.
the items of this subtest are mostly idioms, not expressed in
the “X is Y” form used in the treatment, we may argue that
our experimental training generated a “near transfer effect”
which enhanced the general capability of handling metaphors.
Thus, our study, in line with the results of previous research
(Mashal and Kasirer, 2011; Persicke et al., 2012) indicates
that it is possible to teach explicit procedures to enhance
metaphor comprehension in children with ASD. In addition,
the effectiveness of the experimental treatment, compared to
the ineffectiveness of the training based on Theory of Mind
suggests that the key factors to metaphor comprehension in
this type of children (Norbury, 2005) are specifically linguistic
and semantic. Actually, the child was trained to analyze
both semantic similarities and differences between meanings
pertaining to completely distinct semantic areas (e.g., sky and
scarf)
We believe our findings contribute to the theoretical debate
about novel metaphors comprehension in children with ASD.
We also speculate that a training centered upon the interactive
construction of thinking maps between adult and child would
enhance children’s capability of producing semantic explanations
of novel metaphors even at a younger age. This could be
particularly helpful with children having weaknesses in semantic
representations.
However, we must indicate at least three limitations of
this study. First, the transfer effects of our training need
to be explored by assessing comprehension of other types
of figurative language. Second, there was no control group,
and third, we had no feedback on whether M.M.’s improved
capabilities adequately transferred to metaphor comprehension
in everyday life conversation. These issues and the solidity
of our training effects should be investigated in future
research.
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